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Abstract 
Despite prolonged economic growth, poverty has become a more notable and 
noted feature of Chinese society. The paper examines three phases of 
development since the foundation of the People’s Republic: the central planning 
era (1949 –1978); the pro-urban growth model (1978 – 1999); and more recent 
changes (1999 – 2004). For each phase the nature of the economic and social 
policies are described and the effects on poverty and inequality are examined. 
The limitations of a social policy that is subservient to the economic strategy are 
considered. The alternative of a model of social development based on the 
livelihood approach is analysed and its potential to reduce poverty and 
inequality are considered.  
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Introduction 
Poverty has long been a feature of Chinese society (Li, 2003; Khan, et al., 
2002). The long period of economic growth in China has helped many people 
become richer. A series of research studies in the late 1990s, however, unveiled 
a disturbing fact that alongside the ‘new rich’, there are people suffering from 
absolute poverty including urban marginalized groups, such as the long term 
unemployed (or laid-off workers) and low income households, rural-urban 
migrant workers, and farmers living in remote rural areas. The economic and 
social conditions of the poor contrast sharply with the conditions of the 
booming middle class.  
 
There are very different opinions over the importance of poverty and inequality. 
Since the beginning of the economic reform, a cleavage between economists 
and sociologists has developed. Economists took on the responsibility of 
unleashing China from the control of the central planning system and 
integrating the Chinese economy with the prevailing market economy in the 
world. Various social problems have been left to sociologists whose voices have 
long been overwhelmed by the ‘fast train loaded with gold rushers’ (Guan, 
2003). 
 
As the reform moved on, there was growing awareness of slow social 
development turning to a ‘bottleneck’ of further marketisation and economic 
growth. Thus in the 1990s various social policies, including housing, healthcare, 
pensions and the social safety-net, were forced onto both the political as well as 
the academic agendas. In the new agendas, the Chinese equivalent of the term 
‘social’ is no longer treated as a disturbance only aimed to distract from market 
freedom. The study of social problems was no longer considered to be an 
attempt to disturb social solidarity and stability as in the central planning era 
and the early days of the reform, but rather to be an ‘engineering’ project to 
facilitate further economic growth. Consequently, reforms in social policy areas 
such as housing, pensions, education, healthcare and social security were all 
added to the ‘system’ changes and accelerated in order to facilitate the 
functioning of a stable urban society—the backbone of economic development. 
Following the logic of market reform, the general principle was to reduce the 
welfare burdens of the state sector and promote decentralisation and 
privatisation. 
 
Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1990s, the mounting political and social 
instability represented by protesters, increased urban crime rate and various 
rights issues related to rural-urban labour migration, revealed many social 
problems hidden behind the growing economic prosperity in China. The income 
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of some social groups decreased in absolute value and the gap between the rich 
and the poor widened quickly (Lia, 2003). Confronted with the new social 
challenges, the market appears to be unable to offer a satisfactory solution. 
Contemplation of the social policy reform in China reveals some conflicts: 
1)  The giant engineering projects led by top-down state policy to facilitate 
the growth of business sectors face constraints both in terms of resources 
and the administrative capacity of the system. 
2)  The urban-centric social policy reform and the newly established urban 
social security system are not compatible with the growing pressure of 
growing numbers of redundant rural labours.  
 
At this point, we unavoidably come to a central policy dilemma. Without 
sufficient financial resources, the state will not be able to handle social 
problems yet without dealing with the social problems, economic growth cannot 
be sustained. In this paper, we examine poverty and inequality in China and 
suggest that there need to be efforts to get out of the dilemma. The problems are 
rooted in the focus on the two ends, the accumulation of resources and stability 
of society, both of which seem to rely on the other. In this paper, we argue that 
the arbitrary division between the economic growth and social stability has only 
focussed on financial constraints and choices. It has failed to grasp the potential 
of integrating social development into the overall national development 
strategy. This paper discusses the problems faced by the traditional combination 
of economic development strategies and supportive social policy and looks into 
the alternative—the livelihood approach.  
 
In the following sections, we first study three stages of China’s development. In 
each stage, we look at the economic growth strategies and the overall outcomes; 
then trace the social policy of the same period and identify the impact of 
economic and social changes on poverty and inequality. We then comment on 
the problems of social policy models that are led by economic strategy and 
suggest that the problems posed by economic strategies have literally forced the 
state to take on more tasks on social development. This suggests it is time to 
move towards a more comprehensive approach toward development. In the final 
section, we discuss the livelihood approach and its relevance to resolve China’s 
poverty and inequality.  
 
Development in the People’s Republic of China 
Since the formation of the Communist government in 1949, China has 
experienced many changes of policy and outcomes. There has been much pain 
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and much progress. It is convenient if somewhat arbitrary to distinguish three 
eras of economic development. They are: 
1)  Central Planning era (1949-1978); 
2)  pro-growth urban biased economic reform era which focussed on 
industrial achievement with state provision of various social services and 
social security (1979-1999) and 
3)  pro-poor growth era which begins to deal with poverty, particularly in 
rural areas (2000-2004)1.  
 
The economic policies of each era reflected the political and development 
strategy at the time. Social policy in each era also corresponded to the economic 
strategies to remove the barriers to achieve economic goals. The combination of 
economic and social policies had very different effects on poverty and 
inequality. In this section, we follow the history of development in China to 
examine the economic strategy and outcomes and the social policies and we 
examine the outcomes in terms of poverty and inequality in the three eras.  
 
1.  Central planning era (1949-1978) 
In common with most communist countries, China adopted central planning 
from 1949. The central planning system was an attempt to boost fast growth of 
heavy industries in urban areas. Social policy played a supportive role to 
strengthen the state’s ability to lower labour costs and maintain social control. 
 
1A.  DEVELOPMENT OF HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
When the Communist Party first came into power, the People’s Republic of 
China faced hostility from several sources. First, the new Chinese government 
was not recognised diplomatically by many western powers. Second, the 
dissident government in Taiwan was eager to come back to mainland China. 
Third, in 1949 the Liberation Army were still busy consolidating control in 
western China. Fourth, in 1950, China entered the Korean War. All these factors 
contributed to the feeling of urgency that China needed to build up the ability to 
maintain strong national defence. Domestically, after years of internal war, the 
economy was severely damaged. The economy largely relied on traditional 
farming. Modern industry almost did not exist. The new state had won 
enthusiastic support from the people. The communists’ goal was to ‘fighting for 
                                      
1  Many people call 2003 the beginning of a new era on the basis of the new policy to 
change the treatment of rural-urban migration and rural development. However, 
China’s ‘Developing the West’ program started in 2000, the focus being to narrow the 
gap between coastal and inland areas and boost growth in western China, the poorest 
region. This program aimed at diverting resources from the fast growing coastal areas 
to less developed western provinces.  
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unification, stabilising the country and starting constructions’, all at the same 
time. Immediately after 1949, the priority for development was heavy industry 
and national defence (The First Five Year Plan, 1952). By 1957 when the first 
five year plan was completed, the Chinese government was confidently 
promoting the idea of catching up with the US and Britain by boosting iron and 
steel production--a symbol of industrialisation. By 1957, through systematic 
nationalisation, the economy had been brought completely under state control. 
The state stipulated the intended output levels in heavy industries, in particular 
the output of iron and steel. Light industries’ output and farming production 
were calculated according to the needs of urban heavy industries (Lin et al., 
1994).  
 
Figure 1: GDP per capita (1952-2002) 
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Data source: China Statistics Press, China Statistics Yearbook, Various issues. 
 
The economy recovered and grew very fast during the First Five Year Plan and 
despite catastrophic set backs during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the Cultural 
Revolution, growth was generally maintained. As shown in Figure 1, from 1952 
to 1978, the annual growth rate of GDP averaged 6.5 percent. Industrial 
production grew at 11.4 percent per annum. Heavy industries grew at 13.8 
percent per annum. However, farming output only grew at 2.7 percent per 
annum during the same period. The focus on heavy industries secured high 
capital accumulation in the related sectors and low investment in other 
industries, and in farming. The economic structure changed rapidly from an 
economy dominated by farming to one dominated by heavy industries. In 1949, 
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farming output was 58.5 per cent of the total output, whilst industrial output was 
30 per cent. Heavy industry was only 26.4 per cent of industrial output. By the 
end of the central planning period, in 1978, farming output was only 28.1 
percent of total output, with heavy industry dominating the national economy 
(China Statistics Bureau, 1999).  
 
1B.  URBAN BIASED SOCIAL POLICY 
During the central planning era, various areas of social policy were considered 
to be supportive to industrial production. The basic idea was ‘production first 
and living secondary’. The concept of social development had never been 
written into the national development plans until the ‘Sixth Five Year Plan’, 
well into the reform era (1980-1985). However, the state had intervened heavy-
handedly in various ‘social’ aspects. Starting from 1952, a rationing system was 
established. Social provisions were made to guarantee for urban residents basic 
food, housing, education and healthcare at very low prices.  
 
1. In healthcare, a new system was established, in which government 
employees could enjoy free healthcare and state enterprise employees 
could receive healthcare as a form of labour protection. Healthcare funds 
for government employees were paid directly out of public funds. 
Healthcare funds for enterprise employees were paid by their work units. 
Farmers were not included in the public healthcare system. In the late 
1950s, the state organised farmers and collectives to pay jointly for and 
operate ‘cooperative healthcare’2 in rural areas (Zhang, 2003). In the late 
1960s, cooperative healthcare developed quickly. By 1980, nearly 90 per 
cent of rural areas were covered by cooperative healthcare. 
2. The education system in 1949 was developed from the Communist’s 
education campaigns before the Liberation that had emphasised mass 
education. The focus was on equity through providing primary school 
education to everyone. In the early 1950s, China began to copy the Soviet 
                                      
2  In 1955, in the rural areas of Shangxi and Henan provinces, a number of healthcare 
clinics were established with the help of ‘Rural Production Cooperatives’—the 
authorities at the village level. Members of the cooperatives contributed in the form of 
‘healthcare fees’. The production cooperatives used local public funds to contribute 
for the operation of the clinics. In some cases, farmers contributed to mutual funds to 
pay for cooperative healthcare. Later, a series of documents issued by the central 
government to promote cooperative healthcare to all rural areas in China helped to 
formalise the rural healthcare system. In the rural cooperative healthcare system, all 
financial resources for running the clinics came from farmers contribution or from 
local collectives which accumulated money though local production. Funds were 
pooled locally without state support.  
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Union’s education system. The idea was to link education directly to 
economic development. The new system focused on the direct 
contribution of science and technology and the preparation of skills for 
industrialisation and national defence. As a result, the education system 
was transformed from a universal education system to an elite education 
system with the latter paying more attention to higher education and less 
to basic education, more to science and engineering and less to social 
sciences and the humanities, and more to vocational training and less to 
general education. University education was made free. The state was in 
charge of recruiting students and of job allocation after the students 
finished higher education. This policy ended free labour mobility (China 
Encyclopaedia Press, 1984).  
3. In the 1950s, China began to set up a public housing system in urban 
areas. The purpose of the new system was to make housing a form of 
welfare. Funding for housing construction came from the state and was 
allocated to work units as part of basic construction funds. Employers and 
local authorities were responsible for housing construction and allocation. 
Only urban employees with urban residency were entitled to public 
housing which was owned by the state. Residents of public housing only 
needed to pay a small amount of money as rent. In rural areas, farmers 
were responsible for their own housing. This system was not changed in 
the central planning era.  
4. China started to establish an urban social security system fairly early. In 
1951, the State Council published the first ‘Regulations of Labour 
Security for the People’s Republic of China’. According to this 
regulation, employees working for enterprises of more than 50 staff 
members would be able to enjoy benefits of pension, healthcare, child 
birth and work injuries. The 1953 revision was considered to be the 
beginning of a formal social security system in China. In 1954, the right 
to social security was written into the constitution. It was stipulated that 
when workers became old, sick or disabled, they had the right to receive 
material help. The state promised to organise social security schemes to 
protect this right of workers. In the next twenty years, China gradually 
established retirement and pension schemes for urban employees of state 
and collective work units. At the same time, the urban poor who did not 
have wage income would receive social relief benefits. However, the 
rural population were not included in the social security system (China 
Statistics Bureau, 2002). 
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1C.  POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
Social policy in this era reflected the fact that the priority of developing heavy 
industries was under great resource constraint. The high investment and 
accumulation rates often associated with heavy industries made it impossible for 
other economic sectors to develop at the same rate. Social policy, being a tool to 
facilitate industrialisation, was strictly limited to help urban development. This 
system had several implications for poverty and inequality. 
 
First, during the central planning era, as a result of the development strategy of 
industrialisation through heavy industries and strict control of workers’ salaries, 
the income of the urban population increased only very slowly. In 1978, the 
average disposable income per capita in urban areas was 343 yuan per year, 
35.4 percent higher than that in 1957; if price changes were taken into account, 
the real income growth was 18.5 percent or less than one percent per annum. 
However, as most of the living necessities were rationed by voucher, the actual 
living standard was not directly linked with individual income. Some earlier 
surveys on consumption disclosed the changes in living standard of the urban 
population. In 1957, the average consumption was 222 yuan, of which 130 yuan 
was on food, 27 yuan was on clothes. In 1964, the average consumption was 
221 yuan, 10.4 per cent lower than in 1957 if price changes are considered, of 
which 131 yuan was on food and 24 yuan was on clothes. By the end of the 
central planning era, in 1978, the average consumption was 311 yuan: 131 yuan 
was on food and 24 yuan was on clothes. Allowing for inflation, the level of 
consumption in 1978 was 22.6 percent higher than in 1957. During the period, 
the structure of consumption remained almost unchanged; most household 
spending was on food and clothes (National Statistics Bureau, 1999). In rural 
areas, the annual net income per person in 1978 was 134 yuan, only 40 per cent 
of average urban consumption. In terms of living costs, an average farmer spent 
116 yuan per year on consumption, in which 79 yuan was on food and 15 yuan 
was on clothes (China Statistics Yearbook, various issues). These data on 
income and expenditures suggest that for nearly 30 years, Chinese people’s 
living condition did not improve very much.  
 
In 1978, 28 per cent of the population, about 270 million people, lived in 
absolute poverty3 (Chen, 1998). The Chinese government’s definition of 
                                      
3  It should be noted that the poverty line used in China is much lower than the 
internationally recognised poverty line. The poverty line for 1985 was 206 yuan per 
year. It is adjusted annually for inflation. In 1990, the poverty line was 300 yuan. In 
1999, it reached 625 yuan, much lower than the poverty line of US$1 per day (2800-
2900 yuan per year). Also, in the official statistics, the data used to calculate rural 
income include the income that farmers have to put aside for reinvestment, which is 
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absolute poverty is based on the minimum standard of living, that is not 
suffering from problems of ‘wenbao’ – directly translated as ‘difficulties in 
keeping warm and having a full stomach’. It means that a person should not 
suffer from hunger, have clothes to wear and do not suffer from cold weather. 
For many years, the calculation of numbers in poverty was based on the average 
income of a county. When a county’s average income fell before the minimum 
income level, it would be rated as a ‘county of poverty’, and all people in the 
county would be counted as in poverty. Conversely, no-one in a county on 
average above the poverty level was counted as poor. This system did not 
change until 1996.  
 
Second, the majority of the population in rural areas did not enjoy any of the 
benefits which were available to urban residents. The money income of urban 
residents was 2.6 times of the income of rural residents. If we also include 
benefits, the ratio of rural expenditure to urban expenditure is more unequal. In 
1978 a rural resident’s consumption averaged 138 yuan, while urban residents’ 
consumption averaged 405 yuan, a ratio of 1:2.9 (China Statistics Yearbook, 
1996). 
 
Third, one of the key functions of the social welfare system was control of 
labour mobility. Through job allocation after education, work units’ welfare 
provision and the urban residency registration system, farmers could not live 
and work in urban areas. As a result, industrialisation was not accompanied by 
urbanisation. In 1949, there were 132 cities in China. The non-agricultural 
population in urban areas was 27.4 millions, 5.1 percent of the total population. 
Despite the rapid urbanisation during the 1950s (208 cities and 10.5 percent 
urban non-farming population in 1961), the tightened control in 1962 led to 
serious de-urbanisation. After 1962, the ratio of urban to rural population started 
to decline. By 1978, there were 193 cities and 8.5 per cent of the total 
population were registered as non-farming urban residents, as shown in Figure 
2. 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
on average around one third of the total income. Therefore, if calculated according to 
international standard, rural poverty in China would be more serious than the official 
data have suggested. 
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Figure 2: Rural and Urban Population (1949-2003) 
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Note: Growth of rural population began to slow down after 1978 and increased after 1984. It started to 
slow down again in the late 1990s. Growth of urban population began to accelerate after 1978. The 
several kinky sections in the urban population line such as the rise in urban population in the late 
1950s, in late 1970s and after 2000 were related to policy that affected urbanisation. 
Source: China Statistics Press, China Labour Statistical Yearbook, Various issues. Data for 2003 were 
officially announced. 
 
Finally, within urban areas, inequality was partly disguised by the fact that the 
majority were poor. The system suffered from all the illnesses of central 
planning: incomplete information for the policy makers, low efficiency and low 
productivity under state ownership and, for the purpose of administration, great 
limitation of freedom through highly centralised social control.4 In theory, all 
urban employees in state or collective sectors received equal pay,5 the state 
promised full employment and a range of state sponsored social welfare to make 
sure that basic needs were satisfied from cradle to grave. However, one should 
not neglect that resource constraints meant not everyone could receive the 
stipulated state benefits all at the same time. A queuing system which 
unavoidably cultivated favouritism was particularly visible in the allocation of 
                                      
4  The extent of political control of all activities means that statistics in incomes and 
poverty during this period must be treated with great caution. For example, many 
lived and died in labour camps, omitted from official statistics on poverty. 
5  There were adjustment for skills and working age. 
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housing. What is more, while the education system offered individuals the 
opportunity to have higher education without paying any fee, nevertheless the 
state also had total control of where and what kind of job the graduates would 
work at. Therefore, people with the same qualification could end up very 
differently in terms of career development. Meanwhile, the social security 
system together with the equal pay system had a strong disincentive effect on 
workers. A very good example was the prevalence of people taking advantage 
of labour protection by taking long term sick leave. 
 
The result of central planning was clear. Nearly thirty years of central planning 
led to low productivity even in the fastest growing sector, pervasive poverty 
both in urban and rural areas as well as extremely low morale of the people. 
 
2.  A pro-urban growth model (1978-1999) 
Although both were urban biased, the pro-urban growth model during 1978-
1999 was different from the Central Planning model. After 1978, markets were 
increasingly liberalised. The new model took advantage of all possible sources 
to support growth in urban areas. Before the focus had only been on heavy 
industries. There was much freer labour mobility in contrast to the complete 
state control which caused tremendous difficulties for any changes. From 1978 
to 2000, the solution to achieve economic growth in China was industrialisation 
and urbanisation. The most important indicator of the success of the economy 
that was used was the growth in GDP. Like the experiences of many other 
countries, the model focused on industrial achievement with state provision of 
advanced education for the urban population, housing and transport systems for 
urban expansion, and social security for workers engaged in the process of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Many developing countries had gone through 
a similar path during their transition from rural society to industrialised society. 
Hall and Midgley (2004) have a very clear description of the logic behind this 
model: 
Many political leaders and social scientists today believe that 
poverty has little to do with wider issues of privilege or structural 
inequality and they argue instead that poverty problem can be 
solved when countries promote economic growth by creating free 
markets, reducing government regulations and social services, 
attracting foreign investment and permitting entrepreneurs to 
pursue profits. By adopting a vibrant form of free market 
capitalism, governments create employment opportunities and in 
this way raise the incomes of the poor (Hall and Midgley, 2004, 
p.45). 
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In this section, we first examine China’s growth strategies with regard to 
industrialisation and urbanisation, then look at the role of social policy during 
this period and finally identify the problems behind this type of development. 
 
2A.  INDUSTRIALISATION 
China’s industrialisation after 1978 changed direction. Heavy industries were no 
longer considered the only source of growth. At the beginning of the reform, the 
state set two very simple targets for economic growth: to increase the GDP by 3 
times by the end of 1990 and by another 3 times by the end of 2000.  
 
To achieve the targets, there needed to be reforms in the industrial sector. It was 
acknowledged that the tight state control and closed economy were the key 
constraints on economic development. To change the situation, there were a 
series of reform policies in the industrial sector. First, the state gave up direct 
control over state enterprises allowing enterprises to keep some of their profits. 
Related policies included: 
1)  enterprises were allowed to decide what to produce and how much to 
produce; 
2)  a management responsibility system to give managers greater incentives 
was introduced, and 
3)  enterprises could use variable wages and bonuses to reward employees 
according to their performance. 
 
In the 1990s, reform of large and medium state-owned enterprises became a 
very serious challenge to the economic reform. To avoid the possible effects of 
serious unemployment and accumulation of huge amount of debts, the state 
called for further reforms in state enterprises and allowed new management 
styles and public shareholding. Second, the gradual and incremental reform 
style generated great opportunities for private businesses. The state was eager to 
promote growth in small and private businesses as well as rural industries which 
existed on the margin of the economic system. Third, China began to introduce 
overseas investment and open up trade to the outside world. To attract foreign 
investment, the state implemented favourable tax policies for joint ventures as 
well as foreign companies. Furthermore, some cities and ports were designated 
by the state as special economic zones or development areas in which registered 
enterprises could be exempted from various controls that restricted business 
activities in other parts of the country as well as provided with good business 
services which were heavily subsidised by local governments.  
 
These policies had several outcomes. The economic structure changed 
dramatically. The domination of home-based heavy industries was replaced by 
fast-growing light industries and processing industries which were funded by 
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overseas investors and targeted overseas markets. The dominance of state 
ownership was replaced by a mixed economy in which the state sector took a 
smaller share of the economy. Industrialisation led to higher ratio of industrial 
output to GDP as well as higher employment in industrial sectors, as shown in 
Figure 3. In 2000, total industrial production was 20 times of that of 1978. In 
terms of employment, by the end of 2002, the manufacturing sector employed 
around one in five of urban employees and absorbed nearly one quarter of the 
surplus labour from rural areas (China Statistics Yearbook, various issues).  
 
Figure 3: Composition of Gross National Product (1952-2002) 
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Notes: 
1:  The economic structure has changed with the help of national development plans. During 1952-
1978, the importance of primary sector dropped and the secondary sector gradually became the 
most important sector. This was because of the national economic strategy to develop heavy 
industry. After 1978, the state dropped heavy industry strategy and encouraged light industry as 
well as service industry.  
2:  Data in value terms in this table are calculated at current prices.) 
Data Source: China Statistics Press, China Statistics Yearbook, Various Issues. 
 
2B.  URBANISATION 
Urbanisation policy after the 1970s was mainly designed to cope with the 
pressure of rural surplus labour, the result of rural economic reform and 
increased labour productivity. The basic principle was to maintain the rural and 
urban division and avoid large scale rural-urban migration flooding into large 
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cities. Worried that farmers would flood into cities and cause tremendous 
pressure on the then frail urban infrastructures, the state did not want to remove 
the strict urban resident registration. Rather, it counted on incremental changes, 
allowing rural towns to develop into small cities. The National Urban Planning 
Conference set the principle of urbanisation in 1980: ‘to control the scale of 
large cities, develop medium cities at reasonable pace and develop small cities 
actively’ (China Urban Construction Yearbook, 1989). Under this guideline, 
urbanisation policy experienced several stages. 
 
1. In the early stage of the reform, county level cities were upgraded to 
regional level cities. In three years (1983-1985), 50 regional cities were 
established. Another 50 regional cities were built in the same way up to 
1998. During the same period, the communes in rural areas were replaced 
by a township system which allowed towns to be set up with a lower 
population density requirement. During 1984-1986, 7750 towns were 
created.  
2. In 1986, the state relaxed the definition for new cities. 286 county level 
cities were set up by 1996. In 1992, the state council revised the standard 
for setting up small towns and began to tidy up and expand the township 
system. In 1992-1994, another 4247 towns were set up. 
3. In 1993, the Ministry of Construction decided to focus on developing 
small cities. To facilitate surplus rural population to move into small 
cities, the Ministry of Public Security decided to reform the residential 
registration system of rural areas and small cities. According to the new 
regulations, registered rural residents who had worked and lived in small 
cities for a certain period would be allowed to change their registration to 
permanent residents in small cities when specific requirements were met. 
Later, many small cities removed all residential registration control. 
However, similar policies were not adopted in medium-sized and large 
cities. Rural migrants were not allowed to work freely in these urban 
areas. They needed to satisfy strict requirements before they could start 
working in these cities. 
With these changes, urbanisation accelerated. According to the 5th National 
Census, on 1st November 2001, there were 456 million urban residents, 36% of 
the total population; and 807 million rural residents, 64% of the total 
population. Over the years, the urban population grew but not as fast as China’s 
booming economy had suggested, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
We can compare the experience in some other countries to see the progress of 
China’s urbanisation. Quite unlike China, in many other countries, 
industrialisation was accompanied by rapid urbanisation. One can generally 
observe that urban population increases as the industrial sector grows. This was 
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the case in Britain, for example. At the beginning of the 19th century, around 30 
per cent of British people lived in towns and 21 per cent in towns of over 
10,000 persons. By the end of the century, 80 per cent of the population was 
urbanised. Rural male workers decreased by 40 per cent from 1861 to 1901 
alone (Matthew, 1991).  
 
The extent of urbanisation is shown in Table 1. If we look at some other 
developing countries which are experiencing or experienced rapid 
industrialisation not long ago, such as Mexico and Brazil in Latin America and 
Indonesia and the Philippines in South-East Asia, the ratios of urban population 
to total population are in most cases much higher than what we can see from 
China even after 20 years of fast industrial growth. At the moment, the world 
average level of urbanisation is 47.7 per cent. China is way below the average.  
 
The situation of urban unemployment and township enterprises invited 
questions about the effects of slow urbanisation: is China’s economic growth 
good enough to dissolve the employment pressure and let the poor escape the 
trap of poverty? Many people began to examine more carefully the relationship 
between industrialisation and urbanisation. Figure 4 shows that despite the 
growing urban industrial sector absorbing a large number of rural workers, the 
number of people in rural employment remained largely unchanged. Apart from 
township-village enterprises and a slow growing rural private sector, the 
majority of the rural labourers stayed in rural areas, as shown in Figure 2. This 
raises the question of why, unlike many other countries, the long-lasting 
economic growth in China has not generated commensurate urbanisation.  
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Table 1: Urbanisation in the World (Urban Population as % of Urban 
Population) 
a. Country 1975 2001 
Brazil 61.8  81.7  
Mexico 62.8  74.6  
Philippines 35.6  59.3  
Indonesia 19.4  42.0  
China 17.4  36.7  
India 21.3  27.9  
 
b. Areas 
Developing countries 26.3  40.8  
  Least developed countries 14.7  25.7  
  Arab States 41.5  53.9  
  East Asia and the Pacific 20.2  38.8  
  Latin America and the Caribbean 61.4  75.8  
  South Asia 21.3  29.5  
  Sub-Saharan Africa 21.0  34.8  
Central & Eastern Europe & CIS 57.0  63.0  
OECD 70.4  77.1  
  High-income OECD 73.7  79.1  
High human development 71.7  78.3  
Medium human development 28.1  41.6  
Low human development 19.1  31.6  
High income 73.8  79.4  
Middle income 35.0  51.6  
Low income 22.1  31.5  
World 37.9  47.7  
 
Data Source: UNDP (2003). 
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Figure 4: Rural and Urban Employment (1970-2002) 
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Note: Township and village enterprises became one of an important source of employment for rural 
labour. However, the ability of township enterprises to continue to absorb labourers were limited and 
the total employment in township enterprises remained largely unchanged since mid the 1990s. 
However, starting from the 1950s, cities become the fastest growing sector for employment. 
Data Source: China Statistics Press, China Labour Statistical Yearbook, Various issues. 
 
The answer to this question lies in the long lasting policy-driven rural-urban 
division and a whole series of supporting policies in which social policy played 
a very important role. In the following section, we will look at how social policy 
helped to reinforce the state economic strategy to promote urban growth rather 
than a broader based growth. 
 
2C.  SOCIAL POLICY, INDUSTRIALISATION AND URBANISATION 
Social policy in China’s post reform era was designed to accompany the pro-
urban growth model. Achievement in industrialisation and growth in total 
output were the prime goal for the government and the state was to ‘guarantee’ 
the provision of public services for the fast growing parts of the economy. The 
effect of this was to leave little or nothing for the rural majority. This 
accelerated migration to cities, and it guaranteed growing inequality.  
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In terms of new ideology, as the market reform went on, despite the political 
controls, market principles dominated all business sectors. In social policy, 
however, reform started quite late and was still largely directed by the central 
government through top-down policy making. Quite often, due to the reluctance 
of the reformers to change the status quo, local reform programs developed 
within the framework of the old ‘centrally planned’ system. The continuation of 
urban-centric provision alongside localised reform plans led to wide geographic 
variations and gaps in coverage. 
 
Developments in key social policy areas may be considered in turn. 
1. Establishment of urban health protection system and collapse of rural 
cooperative healthcare.  
The old healthcare system became a heavy burden for the non-state 
sectors. From the 1980s, many enterprises started to develop 
independently from state control. However, the state did not really try to 
deal with healthcare reform until 1999. Therefore, in urban areas, various 
forms of healthcare system came into existence to cope with the funding 
shortage in healthcare. The purposes of these schemes were mainly to 
control costs and provide basic healthcare. Chen (1994) puts the new 
urban healthcare schemes into four categories.  
a. Cost sharing between work units and employees. Employees received 
a fixed amount for healthcare. If they spent less than this fixed 
amount, they could keep the residuals. If they needed to spend more, 
they could claim from the state allocated healthcare funds which were 
maintained by the work units.  
b. Hospital responsibility system. Work units gave up the control of 
funding and allowed hospitals to take over. Hospitals had to bear all 
the costs including salaries for medical professionals.  
c. Health insurance. Individuals received part of the healthcare funds and 
they could spend within the limit without restriction. However, if 
more was needed, they had to bear part of the excess costs.  
d. Fixed coverage. Employers allocated all the state healthcare funds to 
employees and did not bear any extra costs.  
In contrast, the rural cooperative healthcare system which could in theory 
offer primary healthcare to nearly 90 percent of the population collapsed 
as the ability of rural collectives to pool funds for healthcare fell to 
nothing under the influence of household responsibility system.6 
                                      
6  The household responsibility system in China started in 1978. It was a system which 
allowed farmers to leave the old style collectives which, under the central planning 
system, required farmers to work for the collectives and laid down what to produce 
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Hospitals in towns and counties depended less on public funding and 
more on collections. As a result, in the 1990s, more than 50 per cent of 
the cooperative healthcare clinics were operated by profit earning 
individuals (China Healthcare Yearbook, 1999). In many rural areas, in 
particular the poor areas, farmers had to pay for healthcare out of their 
own pocket. 
 
2. Enforcement of the elite education system and deteriorating rural 
education.  
Starting from the 1980s, the elite education system was further 
strengthened by the establishment of ‘beacon schools’ at various levels. 
According to this system, primary and secondary schools as well as high 
schools were to train and select talented students for university education. 
Students were selected strictly according to their exam results. Therefore, 
the focus of the education system lay in higher education which was 
considered to be the most important level to satisfy the demand for 
industrialisation and economic development. Under the same principle, 
rural areas failed to attract state investment in education. Most of the 
‘beacon schools’ were set up in urban areas. Investment in compulsory 
education in rural areas was much lower than in urban areas. The gap 
grew even faster in the 1990s (Xiao, 2003). In the 1990s, education at 
various levels was more and more geared toward paid education. Even 
students in compulsory education had to pay high tuition fees. The 
tendency to collect high tuition fees became more explicit in higher 
education in the late 1990s when the state decided to transform education 
into a market sector with households sharing the costs of higher education 
by paying tuition fees. The fees for ordinary universities were as high as 
the average annual income of an urban employee (Xiao, 2003). This 
system increasingly helped to force prospective students from poorer 
backgrounds to give up education. 
 
3. Privatisation in urban housing.  
Since state housing provision only existed in urban areas, housing reform 
occurred only in cities. Housing reform started from the 1980s. The 
purpose of the reform was to relieve state employers from the burden of 
housing provision and help households to build up savings to pay for 
housing in the long run. For nearly two decades, the state was trying to 
withdraw from direct housing provision, re-establish housing as a 
commodity, and push individuals to take up housing costs. Gradually, the 
                                                                                                                               
and how to distribute the products. In the household responsibility system, farming 
decisions are made at household level. Farmers are responsible for production on their 
own land and sell their own products in the market. 
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state stopped being the main provider of houses; employers took on a 
greater role in organising savings (through individual accounts) and 
individuals relied more on the market than on the state and employers to 
acquire housing.  
 
4. Individual accounts for social security and empty account pension 
system.  
Until 1997, China had established a two-part social security system: 
social insurance for urban employees and social relief for the poorest. The 
former only covered the state sector and part of the private sector. The 
latter was used for rural areas and the urban private sector. Social relief 
was based on means-testing and other conditions such as inability to work 
and being without relatives (Shang, 2001). Under the pressure of urban 
disturbances caused by private employers’ inability to pay for pension 
and healthcare, in the late 1980s, a pension system was established based 
on a mutual fund. The system depended on employer contributions based 
on forecast expenditures. As the overall economic situation improved, 
employers had to pay higher rates of contribution. Thus, many enterprises 
could not afford to pay and were on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1997, the 
state took action to reduce the burdens for the contributors: this stopped 
the government’s collection of administration costs, integrated the 
administration of pension funds and forced more employers to participate 
in paying contributions (Shang, 2001). Apart from the administration, the 
new system was not different from the old system in that both depended 
on high contributions and the new contributions were paid to the retired 
straightaway on a pay-as-you-go-basis. The new system stopped counting 
on the employers to collect and distribute pension. It was operated 
through a social pooling mechanism operated by the local government.  
 
In rural areas, the state began to experiment with a new social security 
system which aimed at shifting the existing ‘collective security’ to ‘social 
security’. Individuals were the main contributors to their social security 
funds. Rural collectives could also contribute on a voluntary basis. By the 
end of 1998, more than 65 per cent of the rural areas adopted the social 
safety-net scheme which covered more than 800 million rural residents. 
At the same time, a rural poverty relief scheme was established by the 
state to use public and private finance to support remote and poor rural 
areas.  
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5. Greater labour mobility.  
In 1982, the State Council published ‘Administrative Measures on the 
Arrest and Eviction of Urban Vagrants and Beggars’ (State Council Issue, 
12-05-1982). The regulation was largely used to catch and punish rural 
migrants who lacked official approval. This regulation allowed the police 
to arrest and evict people from rural areas if they could not show their 
identity card on the spot. In the late 1980s, the state abandoned the 
regulations preventing farmers from going into urban areas to work. 
However, this did not mean that farmers could become urban citizens and 
enjoy the same treatments as their urban peer workers. The system 
continued to generate prohibitive barriers preventing the rural population 
from moving to the urban areas.  
 
Despite the greater efforts on rural poverty relief, social policy in the 1980s and 
1990s remained largely urban-centric and counted very much on employer 
contributions. It served the rapid growth in urban areas and to a certain degree 
facilitated the process of enhanced urban industrialisation.  
 
2D.  POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
Reform in China enhanced economic efficiency and the growth of the economy 
lifted a large number of people above the absolute poverty line. However, as the 
economy continued to grow, it became clear that the pro-growth strategy was 
not improving the well-being of the lowest income groups. Economic growth 
tended to reinforce and improve the financial well being of the people that had 
already become rich rather than remove poverty at the same pace as during the 
early years of reform (Chen and Wang, 2001).  
 
The combination of the economic strategy and the social policy in this era had 
several implications for poverty and inequality.  
 
The result of the fast long-term growth was impressive but not without many 
problems, as shown by Chen and Ravallion (2004). In the 1980s, the economic 
growth reduced the number of people living in poverty. Table 2 shows the 
changing poverty line, used by the Chinese government.7 The 1978 poverty line 
was set on an undefined basis whereas from 1984 it has been based on 
nutritional needs and updated as prices changed. Table 2 also shows the 
percentage of the rural population who were poor. The data suggest that rural 
poverty had decreased rapidly during the earlier reform period, almost halving 
from 1978 to 1984, although this change is not based on a consistent poverty 
                                      
7  We cannot find comparable data using international standard before 1985. 
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line. Rural poverty further decreased, but not as fast as the earlier period, during 
the late 1980s. However, the trend of poverty reduction was not steady. 
 
In the 1990s, China began to use the internationally recognised poverty line of 
US $2 per day. According to this standard, the number of people who were poor 
increased dramatically from 730.8 million in 1987 to 824.6 million in 1990. The 
poverty rate did not start to fall again until 1993. If we look at the very poorest 
people living below $1 per day, earlier growth did help to lift more than 300 
million people out of absolute poverty. However, the number later increased, 
from 308.4 million in 1987 to 374.8 million in 1990, more than one fifth higher. 
Although the number fell in the 1990s, unlike the steady reduction of the 
number of people living under $2 per day, the number of people living under $1 
per day did not go down steadily, which suggests a relatively stable number of 
people who were trapped in poverty. The growth model did not work equally 
effectively for all groups. As the economy continued to grow, the gap between 
the rich and the poor also grew. The growth rates of income rose as one moved 
up the distribution. The annual rate of growth in the 1990s was about three 
percent for the poorest percentile and nine percent for the richest (Ravallion, 
2004). 
 
The social insurance and social security system were increasingly incompatible 
with the growing private sector. Welfare provision was largely dependent on 
local government and business both to pay for it and administer it. Although the 
state tried to establish a work-based contribution system to finance a social 
safety-net, it could no longer force all enterprises to commit themselves to 
welfare tasks. As a result, the gaps in coverage widened. Many people from the 
non-state sectors were excluded from the ‘new’ social protection schemes. 
Although, in the late 1990s, the state took actions to secure contributions from 
more employers, many enterprises simply could not afford the high rate of 
contributions (Shang, 2001).  
 
In terms of employment, the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’8 and state owned and collective 
‘work units’ ceased to protect the majority of urban employees. The number of 
people employed in urban state and collective sectors dropped as market 
competition forced many enterprises to close down or reduce labour costs to 
raise efficiency, as shown in Figure 5. At the same time, private companies, 
joint ventures and overseas companies started to provide more and more 
employment opportunities.  
 
                                      
8  The ‘unbreakable’ source of food, which meant that employers offered permanent 
jobs and full welfare protection to all employees. 
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Table 2: Rural Poverty 1978-2002 
  Poverty line 
yuan/year 
Rural Population 
(million) 
Rural population 
in poverty (million) 
Rural poor/rural 
population (%) 
1978 100 790.1 250 31.6 
1984 200 803.4 128 15.9 
1985 206 807.6 125 15.5 
1986 213 811.4 131 16.1 
1987 227 816.3 122 15.0 
1988 236 823.7 97 11.8 
1989 259 831.6 102 12.3 
1990 300 841.4 85.1 10.1 
1991 304 852.8 94 11.0 
1992 317 848.0 80.6 9.5 
1993 350 851.7 70.2 8.2 
1994 440 855.5 70 8.2 
1995 530 850.5 65.4 7.7 
1996 580 864.4 60 6.9 
1997 640 866.4 49.6 5.7 
1998 635 868.7 42.1 4.9 
1999 625 870.2 34.1 3.9 
2000 625 807.4 32.1 4.0 
2001 625 795.6 29.3 3.7 
2002 627 782.4 28.2 3.6 
 
Note: Data for rural population are from China Statistics Bureau: 
a) Data of rural population for 1978 was were taken from the annual reports of the Ministry of Public 
Security. Data for 1982-1989 were adjusted on the basis of the 1990 national population censuses. 
Data for 1990-2000 were adjusted on the basis of the estimated on the basis of the 2000 national 
population censuses. Data in 2001 and 2002 have been estimated on the basis of the annual national 
sample surveys on population changes. 
b) The data on poverty lines and rural poverty are officially published data. However, they are open to 
many qualifications, especially the numbers before and for 1978. They use methodologies that are not 
fully comparable to those calculated according to internationally recognized poverty lines. However 
the overall trend suggested by the series suggest a long term decline in absolute poverty in China. The 
poverty line for 2002 was equivalent to $0.66/day. 
Data sources: China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Summary Report, various issues. China 
Statistics Bureau, China Rural Poverty Monitor Report, various issues.  
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Figure 5: Urban Employment (1978-2001) 
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Note: The labour demand in the state and collective sectors, the only sources of employment during 
the central planning era, began to drop in the mid 1990s and early 1990s respectively, Private sector, 
overseas sector and self employment appeared in the 1990s and became important job providers. 
Data source: China Statistics Press, China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
The differences between rural and urban areas became greater than ever. The 
favourable policies to support urban industrialisation, the unquenched demand 
for urban spending, and the priority given to maintaining urban stability were in 
part underpinned by the rural tax revenues which deprived rural areas of 
development opportunities (Gordon and Li, 2002; Pieke, 2002; Li, et al., 1998). 
At the same time, the reforms maintained, to a large extent, the rural-urban 
division forcing rural industrialisation onto a very different path from urban 
development. In rural areas, township and village enterprises (TVEs) had 
offered opportunities for farmers to leave farmland and work in industrial 
sectors. China’s experiences of transforming farmers into industrial workers 
without forcing them to leave their home town had become a new model for 
industrialisation and had drawn a lot of attention from international society 
(such as overseas research interests and international organisations like the 
World Bank). It was a new model of modernisation in which farmers left their 
land but not their home and entered factories but not the cities. Qian (2003) and 
Jefferson and Rawski (2002) attributed this innovation to the lack of clear 
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property rights. However, the phenomena of TVEs raises many questions. Why 
would farmers prefer to work in TVEs than in private enterprises in urban 
areas? Why did the urban society welcome the fact that farmers did not need to 
go to cities to work in factories? When the rural-urban population control 
mechanism is taken into account, answers to these questions become fairly 
straightforward. More farmers would like to leave the farmland and work in 
industries. However, under the old state regulations, they were not allowed to 
move freely and work in the urban areas. TVEs met the demand for providing 
jobs in the industrial sectors without having to acquire urban residency. TVEs 
were a result of the absence of alternatives. 
 
From what we have discussed above, several elements were missing in the pro-
growth model which prevented it working to the benefit of all:  
1. A flexible labour market which allowed people to move from one place to 
another to take advantage of employment opportunities;  
2. Compatible industrialisation and urbanisation which relieved the pressure 
of excess labour in rural areas; and  
3. Sufficient resources to provide infrastructures and public services 
necessary for rural areas.  
 
In the 1990s, the Chinese society was not an integrated society. The majority of 
the population still lived far away from the cities. There were still great barriers 
for people to move from rural to urban areas. Even when farmers had 
opportunities to work and live in cities, they did not enjoy the rights and 
benefits that were available to urban residents. Even when the control over 
migration became less tight, the gap in education was a barrier for rural 
migrants facing the challenges of urban job requirements. Therefore, even when 
they came to urban areas, they remained at the bottom of the society (Sha and 
Jiang, 2003) and were treated like an underclass (Lia, 2004; Lu, 2002).  
 
3.  Recent changes (2000-2004) 
From 2000, the problems with the pro-urban growth model became ever more 
obvious, in particular the tension between the slow progress in rural areas and 
fast growing urban areas. People started to question whether the long-lasting 
growth and prosperity would be sustained and expressed concerns over the 
threat of overheating in urban growth and worries over the possibility of a ‘hard 
landing’ for the economy, i.e. a fast cooling down through economic crises and 
social disturbance. Partly in search of a ‘soft-landing’ and finding an outlet for 
the overinvestment in urban areas, and partly to ease the social pressures, the 
state began to reconsider the development strategy. 
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Since China adopted the open door policy and began to offer favourable 
treatment to investment and businesses in coastal areas in the 1980s, a 
difference between ‘coastal’ and ‘inland’ areas developed in terms of economic 
growth and income levels, with the ‘west’ suffering much slower growth. Over 
two decades, investment from inside and outside the country had poured into 
coastal areas. The economy in the east boomed. By contrast, inland areas were 
not so attractive to investment and, for quite a long time, did not enjoy 
favourable tax treatment, did not receive as much money for infrastructure 
construction, and did not reform so rapidly as coastal areas--and failed to 
become as prosperous. If we compare the rural areas only, it was much easier 
for farmers living in coastal areas to find non-farming jobs in cities than for 
farmers living in inland areas. Therefore, inter-regional income inequality in 
rural areas between the coastal regions and inland regions also increased (Li, 
2002; Kanbur and Zhang, 2002; Khan and Riskin, 2000; Kanbur and Zhang, 
1999).  
 
In mid 1999, the Central Government approved the ‘Developing the Western 
Region’ strategy. In 2000, the Office of the Leading Group for Western Region 
Development of the State Council was established to lead the new economic 
strategy (State Council, 2000, No. 33). For 15 years, economic development in 
the western region had lagged behind the other parts of China. The average 
income gap between the east and the western provinces further widened. In 
1985, the average income of the eastern region was 1.15 times of that of the 
west; this increased to 1.42 in 1995 and was 1.40 in 1999 (China Statistics 
Yearbook, various issues). The purpose of the strategy was to narrow the gap in 
incomes and regional development, maintain social and political stability in the 
west through boosting economic development, and create new engines for 
economic growth. There were five aspects of the government plan: 
infrastructure construction (especially water power, communications, 
transportation, tourism and broadcasting), ecological development and 
environmental protection; improvement of the structure of industries (creating 
new sources of growth); development of technology and education and 
acceleration of skills trainings; and promotion of reforms and openness. Under 
the government guidance, large quantities of funds and investment were shifted 
into western China to engage in large scale projects as well as financing 
development policies (Zhang, 2003). 
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In the 10th Five Year Plan, for the first time in the history of P.R. China, the 
three ‘F’ issues9 (sannong wenti)—farmers, farming and farming areas—were 
put high on the agenda. The purpose was to remove the barriers that prevent 
farmers from getting out of poverty. The first step toward increasing income 
was to remove many unreasonable taxes and charges on farmers’ incomes (Lib, 
2003). The second step was the restructuring of production encouraging more 
economic crops and fewer staples and developing food processing industries. 
These methods were to help farmers to overcome the problems of the higher 
price elasticity of staples in the market, and to help develop the market for farm 
produce by providing better information and infrastructures. As to the farmers 
living in areas which were not suitable for farming or too isolated, the state 
planned to relocate the farmers in nearby urban areas.  
 
At the same time, to ease the pressure generated by excess rural labour, the state 
decided to further encourage the development of small cities and towns. In 
2001, the government reformed the urban residency registration for small cities 
and towns. According to the new regulations, all people from rural areas with 
long term residence, a stable job or source of living, together with their family 
members in small cities and towns could apply for permanent urban residency. 
Some local areas also took active measures to encourage farmers from remote 
areas to resettle in urban areas. The purpose was to help them escape the trap of 
poverty. In large cities, the detention of rural workers by the police was banned. 
The detention and eviction regulation of 1982 was withdrawn and replaced with 
‘Administrative Measures on Helping and Managing Poor Urban Vagrants and 
Beggars (Draft)’ (State Council, 2003). There were also state led campaigns to 
collect delayed salary payments to rural workers. Although these efforts 
facilitated migration from rural to urban areas, the residency registration system 
continues to exist. There were still unequal rights for urban and rural residents 
as citizens.  
 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY  
These recent changes reflect the increasing flexibility in the labour market and 
greater determination to tackle rural poverty. Again, social policy served an 
accompanying role. Developing the western regions and relieving burdens for 
farmers were designed to increase farmers’ income. However, despite these 
efforts, China still faced challenges in poverty and inequality. Since the later 
1990s, poverty and inequality began to develop some distinctive features. 
                                      
9  ‘Three ‘F’ issue’ is a direct translation of the Chinese term ‘三农问题’ (Sannong 
Wenti, or more directly three ‘Nong’ issues), which is the short form for three 
important aspects of rural issues: 农业（nongye)，农村(nongcun)，农民(nongmin). 
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First, there were ‘new poor’ in urban areas – people who have never managed to 
improve their living standard at all since the reforms (Wu, 2002). Marginalised 
groups such as the disabled, the long-term sick and the elderly who have no 
support from the community and relatives are the traditional type of poor people 
in the society. In the late 1990s, the ‘new poor’ became visible in the urban 
poverty profile. They are people who lost their jobs, failed in their businesses, 
or simply could not gather sufficient means to support their own families. At the 
same time, a lot of farmers left their home and land and came to urban areas to 
look for jobs in the factories. Many of these rural-urban migrants lived very 
close to the poverty line (Chen, 2002). The officially registered urban 
unemployment rate changed from 0.1 per cent in 1980 to 4.3 per cent in 2003. 
However, it is estimated that if unregistered unemployment is included, the 
actual urban unemployment rate can be as high as 10 per cent (Lib, 2004). 
Nowadays, urban unemployment is the fastest growing source of urban poverty. 
Some of the new poor managed to get out of poverty fairly quickly through 
finding new jobs or starting their own businesses or even moving to a different 
place to find jobs, whilst others found it difficult to cope.  
 
Second, in rural areas, three ‘F’ issues--farming, farmer and farming areas (in 
essence, rural poverty issues) have grown to be ever more challenging to policy 
makers. By the end of 2003, there were still three per cent of rural residents 
living in absolute poverty (People’s Daily, 27 May, 2004). Also, 6.2 per cent of 
the rural population lived close to the poverty line and suffered from transient 
poverty or fell into poverty because of unexpected risks such as natural 
disasters, bad harvest, or shortage of working capital (Jalan and Ravallion, 
2001, 1999, 1998). Table 1 shows the trend of poverty reduction since 1990. Up 
to now, there are still a large number – nearly 30 million – of people living in 
absolute poverty. What is more, throughout the 1990s, the living standard of the 
poorest continued to deteriorate in absolute terms (Lia, 2003). 
 
Third, income inequality between the urban rich and the urban poor increased 
considerably (Meng, 2002; Guan, 1999; Khan, et. al, 1999; Milanovic, 1997; 
Knight, and Song, 1991). The officially published Urban Gini Coefficient for 
disposable income is above 0.30. The trend of growing inequality in urban areas 
is very clear, as shown in Figure 6. This is a result of the relatively slower 
income growth of the lowest income groups compared to the highest income 
groups (Meng, 2004). What is more, the increase of Gini Coefficient rose more 
sharply at the end of the 1990s. 
 
Fourth, the gap between different regions remains very wide. According to the 
survey by the General Survey Team of Rural Areas of China National Statistics 
Bureau, by the end of 2002, 29 million people in western rural China were in 
poverty (annual consumption below 869 yuan), equivalent to 50.6 per cent of 
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the total poor population in China. In the middle inland area, the number of 
rural residents in poverty was 18 million, 31.4 per cent of the total. In the east 
(coastal areas), there were 11 million poor, 18.0 per cent of the national total. 
This suggests that poverty is distributed unevenly across the country. The 
poverty problems are much more serious in the inland areas, in particular, in the 
west, than in the coastal areas. Places like the more urbanised coastal areas 
which can offer more job opportunities attract the largest number of rural 
labourers. 
Figure 6: China’s Income Inequality (1978-2000) 
 
Data Sources: China Statistics Bureau, Household Survey, related years. 
 
Fifth, and most seriously, income inequality between urban and rural areas has 
become one of the highest in the world (Yang, 2002; Benjamin et al., 2000; 
Benjamin and Brandt, 1999; Yang and Tang, 1999). The official statistics have 
underestimated the seriousness of the inequality. In 2001, the average income of 
urban residents was 6860 yuan and that of rural residents was 2366 yuan (China 
Statistics Yearbook, 2001). Urban average income was nearly three times rural 
average income. However, 40 per cent of farmers’ income is in the form of farm 
produce. If this 40 per cent is deducted, the monthly income of farmers fell to 
only 1800 yuan. In addition, farmers usually used around 20 per cent of their 
income to reinvest in the production of the next year. Thus, farmers’ net 
disposable income is much lower than the official statistics suggest. In contrast, 
if urban welfare benefits, such as healthcare and education, housing subsidies 
and pensions, and other grey incomes, such as ‘moonlight’ income are all 
Gini Coefficient
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Rural
Urban
 29 
included, the average income of urban residents can be as high as 7200 yuan. 
The adjusted ratio of urban average income to rural average income can be at 
least 6:1 (Qiu, 2002). 
 
Beyond these traditional divisions, some new phenomena have been largely 
neglected by official statistics. So far, rural migrants to urban areas are not 
included in any urban poverty studies as rural-urban migrants are not registered 
as urban residents. Further, because of the incentives of the local government to 
over- or under-state poverty for political or financial reasons, the statistics on 
urban poverty are not accurate. Researchers have very different estimates of the 
total number of urban poor (Hussain, 2003; Li, 2001; Khan, 1998; Li and 
Gustafson, 1998). The most frequently quoted number, ‘14-15 million’, is the 
estimate of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the National Statistics Bureau and All 
China Trade Union after their separate surveys during 1999-2000. However, 
many researchers argue that this number underestimates the actual poverty 
situation in urban China (Tang, 2002). Because of the shortage of systematic 
information, the extent of urban poverty has not been fully assessed. 
 
The limits of economic strategy-led social policy 
From what we have seen from the history of development in China so far, social 
policy has played an accompanying role which serves the purposes designated 
by the top-down, targeted economic strategies. Since these economic strategies 
were focused on specific goals—heavy industries, urban areas, or infrastructures 
in the west—social policy has also been designed to cater for these special 
needs. However, a full picture of poverty and inequality suggests that these 
development models often neglected the demand for development in the rest of 
the country. The strategies were based on resource constraints—a large country 
could not afford to scatter the limited resources all over the place. Yet this view 
failed to recognize the connections between different policies, different regions 
and different groups of people within the country, and their ability to have an 
impact on each other. 
 
The path of development in China displays several distinct characteristics. 
1. Despite the rapid changes in the economy, the essential relation between 
economic policy and social policy has not changed much over the years. 
Both in the central planning era and the reform era, social policy served 
as a tool to realise economic strategies. During the central planning era, 
there was urban-biased social policy to support heavy industries in urban 
areas. In the pro-urban growth era, there was urbanisation and urban 
social reform to support a wider growth in urban industrial sectors. In 
 30 
these areas, social policy was considered to be supportive to economic 
growth and, therefore, people outside the centre of growth were not cared 
for as much as the others. The work-based social policies in housing, 
pension and healthcare are obvious examples of protecting people in 
urban employment.  
2. The relationship between social policy and economic strategies had 
implications for poverty and inequality. During the planning era, the most 
important effect was the strict social control of both the urban residents 
and the rural residents in all policy areas and the different treatment of 
rural and urban residents in various aspects of social policy. The pro-
urban growth era continued to use many of the discriminatory policies 
that were used earlier. Although the reform sparked rapid urban growth, it 
treated economic growth as the priority, for which rural areas had to be 
sacrificed to support urban growth. Social policy helped to reinforce the 
poverty in rural areas and rural: urban inequality. 
 
The economic strategy-led social policy has had a number of weaknesses.  
 
First, the pro-urban growth model which did not pay attention to the bottom of 
the society led to a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor as a 
relatively small part of the economy continues to grow at much faster pace than 
the rest. The trickle-down effect which was anticipated by the reformers was not 
be realised within the pro-urban growth social policy framework. 
 
Second, although more recent reforms try to deal with rural poverty issues, it is 
driven by the reformers ideas of developing the west. There is no guarantee that 
this will not become one of the many ‘new economic growth points’, such as 
rural household responsibility system and township enterprises, that did not last 
as the state moved on to a new strategy. 
 
Third, the gap between urban and rural areas generated by the pro-urban growth 
model continued to attract rural labourers to move to urban areas which might 
provide better employment opportunities, as shown in Figure 7. However, new 
large scale migration challenges urban infrastructures and the ability of the 
urban social system to cater for the needs of a fast-growing population. The 
current social control system and the biased social welfare provision in large 
cities cannot really solve the problems in the long run as the labour market 
becomes more flexible. 
 
All these weaknesses have their consequences in poverty and inequality. 
However, before any prescription can be suggested, it is crucial to raise a 
fundamental question: do poverty and inequality matter?  
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The debate over whether poverty and inequality matter has several aspects: 
1)  Whether the increasing inequality will at some point affect economic 
growth and whether a certain degree of inequality can contribute to 
economic growth? 
2)  How to justify the growing inequality when the well-being of the poorest 
is not improved? 
 3) How far can the society contain inequality? There are several views on 
these questions.  
 
Figure 7: Rural Labourers working in Agricultural and Non-Agricultural 
Sectors 
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Note: The number of labourers by sector in this table is classified by main activity. For example, those 
engaged primarily in agriculture and secondarily in commerce are classified under farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery. 
Data Source: China Statistical Press, China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
People supporting priority for economic over social development argue that the 
growing inequality in China is rooted in the historical legacy of central planning 
and poverty. To overcome the problems of poverty, the first order solution lies 
in economic growth and through this the poor can escape poverty gradually. 
Therefore, at this stage, China should pursue economic growth and cannot 
afford to slow down the momentum of growth with too much redistribution. 
What is more, it is argued, there is no clear proof that inequality threatens 
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economic growth. The pro-growth idea is also the official line followed by the 
Chinese government in the last two and half decades: pro-growth policies that 
promote industrialisation and urbanisation will create more wealth and 
employment opportunities and finally lift all the population out of poverty (Fan, 
2003; Liu, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, the threat of greater social instability has intensified (Lia, 2003; 
Yang, 2002; Yep, 2002). On the one hand, corruption and various rent-seeking 
activities that aim at benefiting some privileged groups have become more 
serious than ever (Chen, 2002). On the other, the higher risks of unemployment 
and the loss of basic social protection, and, in rural areas, farmers having to 
cope with heavy burdens of taxes and charges, generate strong feelings of 
deprivation among the disadvantaged groups (Lia, 2003). 
 
Internationally, there has been a renewed interest in inequality (World Bank, 
2004; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). The renewed interest is stimulated by 
empirical evidence suggesting that there is a negative relationship between 
inequality and growth, which means that economies with greater inequality tend 
to have lower economic growth. Inequality affects economic growth through 
political economy (Findlay and Wellisz, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Banerji, et al., 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Perotti, 1996; Bénabou, 1996a; 
Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1997; Chang, 1998), through social channels (Rodrik, 
1997) and through imperfect capital markets (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 
Saint-Paul, 1994; Bénabou, 1996a, 1996b). As suggested by the arguments and 
evidence provided in the literature, in the long run economic growth may be 
slowed down by inequality and may fall into a vicious cycle of more unequal 
distribution and slower growth. 
 
Whatever the different opinions over the evidence on the relation between 
economic growth and inequality, the Chinese Government is attempting to 
combine growth with reduced poverty and inequality. This provokes a 
complicated and difficult question for China: how to strike a balance between 
restricting market power to prevent further widening of the inequality of income 
and at the same time not bringing economic development to a stop? 
 
Having reviewed the history of China’s development, an answer to this question 
may be found through the previous experiences of China. The mounting 
attention to reform in various social policy areas in the 1990s, and even more 
after 2000, suggests that many changes in social welfare system and social 
services, in particular concerning the poor and vulnerable groups, have 
gradually gained importance in China’s overall development. This trend shows 
that social development, though not the prime target of the reform, has become 
more significant. In other words, during the reform, to clear away ‘barriers’ to 
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further economic development, the Chinese government has already been 
‘forced’ to go on a path toward social development. It seems that in the last two 
and a half decades, while China has focused on economic growth it addressed 
some problems in social development when they began to affect economic 
progress. Various aspects of social development including urbanisation, poverty 
relief, employment and social protection had to be dealt with as the reform 
moved along. The efforts in this aspect can be briefly summarised as:  
1)  In the urban areas: a) carrying out urban social welfare reform to 
transform state welfare to contribution-based mixed welfare; b) building 
up social protection for the unemployed and the disadvantaged group; 
and, c) loosening social controls. 
2)  In rural areas: a) using urbanisation in rural areas to solve the pressure of 
rural-urban migration on the existing urban infrastructure; b) carrying out 
poverty relief through income redistribution and various social supports; 
c) investing in rural infrastructure to help farmers to earn a living; and, d) 
relocating farmers from remote and isolated areas to urban areas to help 
them to escape poverty.  
3)  Gradually loosening control over rural-urban migration. 
 
These changes involved several transitions: from state dominated welfare 
provision and social control to a mixed social system in which the state, 
employers and individuals all play a part; from financial redistribution to 
providing various resources or capital (such as infrastructure, information, 
training and education) to help people to avoid or cope with poverty.  
 
However, as demonstrated earlier in this paper, though the unintended 
piecemeal changes in social development had some positive impacts, they are 
not necessarily well connected and they lack a comprehensive approach to some 
fundamental issues such as poverty and inequality and the coordination between 
social and economic policies. Some policies can be protective to urban 
economic interests but fail to consider the effect of the rural-urban interactions; 
for example, policies that failed to cater for the need for rural-urban migration 
and policies that ignore rural economic support to urban economic stability. 
Some policies can be redistributive in the short term but do not boost the 
potential of individuals or communities to improve their own life. Some policies 
can be designed to resolve economic problems but fail to realise that there can 
be social problems behind the proposed solutions and are therefore defeated by 
lack of preparation; for example, some farmers moved from remote rural areas 
to new towns and found themselves trapped in even greater poverty because of 
unemployment and poor infrastructure. All these aspects suggest that without 
the determination to make social development a central goal, poverty and 
inequality may be reduced, but they may also get worse. 
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The experience of China highlights the need to adopt a broader based social 
development approach. Poverty and inequality may generate unprecedented 
social tensions. Urban unemployment plus surplus rural labour put great 
pressure on the economy. The already strained engine of growth has found it 
hard to absorb an unlimited supply of labour. The state has found it almost 
impossible to stretch the limited resources to redistribute to the poor. The 
predicament calls for a new model of development to help the economy to grow 
without fear of economic and social crises.  
 
As we summarised above, the piecemeal social reforms show that China 
through its gradual and pragmatic reform is converging slowing on the social 
development model which emphasises making use of resources at many levels 
to build up the necessary capital for human development. In the following 
section, we introduce the livelihood approach and examine its relevance to 
China’s experience.  
 
A social development model—the livelihood approach 
The livelihood approach emerged through the search for an integrated approach 
to tackling poverty and deprivation. The ‘sustainable livelihoods framework’ 
has been developed into an analytical and operational tool. It moves away from 
single-sector strategies and allows ‘livelihood strategies to be analysed within 
their wider environment, and context-specific solutions to be devised based on 
local capacities and needs’ (Hall and Midgley, 2003, p.7). It responds to the 
problems of a biased growth model and emphasises tackling the causes of 
poverty and striving for balanced growth. In the livelihood approach, social 
policy is no longer an attachment to the growth strategies. It takes a holistic 
view of social policy, in which welfare provision and safety nets only play a 
minor part. As Hall and Midgley put it: 
In this conceptualisation, social policy is concerned essentially 
with more fundamental questions of sources and stability of 
employment, support institutions, processes and structures that 
determine people’s well-being as well as broader natural and 
political factors which encourage and constrain human 
development (Hall and Midgley, 2003, p.6). 
The livelihood approach identifies several sources of human development. The 
sources are represented in the form of capital or assets. The model does not look 
at financial resources as the only way to get people out of poverty. Rather, it 
attends to the availability and interaction of different types of capital in order to 
enhance the ability of an individual, community or a society to maintain long 
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term development. In the following sections, we first introduce the basic 
elements in the model and then discuss its relevance to China. 
 
The model 
There are differences in the typology of capital. The UK Department for 
International Development distinguishes five types of capital: financial capital, 
physical capital, human capital, natural capital and social capital (DFID, 2001, 
p44). Piachaud (2002) separates public infrastructure, or collective physical 
capita, from other physical capital. In this paper, we include both natural capital 
and public infrastructures and distinguish six types of capital, as follows: 
1. Financial capital—derived from work income, savings, capital gain, 
inheritance and gifts, and profits. 
2. Natural capital—environmental resources for livelihood and sustainable 
development, such as clean water and air which can be improved through 
investment in environmental protection (DFID, 2001). 
3. Human capital—individual skills and capacities which can be 
accumulated through investment in education, training and work 
experience. 
4. Physical capital—the stock of physical assets that can be used to produce 
goods and services.  
5. Social capital—networks, norms, rules and social values. These are the 
collective component of human capital and collective human values and 
relations.  
6. Public infrastructure—collective physical capital, such as drains, schools, 
hospitals, roads and other public facilities (Piachaud, 2002), which can be 
improved through investment in the relevant infrastructures. 
 
These sources of livelihood are not isolated from each other. For example, 
financial and physical capital can be traded but not the others. All the types of 
capital need investment (either in money, goods, labour or time) to build up. 
They jointly contribute to the future level of living (Piachaud, 2002). Absence 
or insufficiency in one or more types of capital may result in poverty whether of 
individuals, families, villages or regions. 
 
There are several differences between the pro-urban growth model and the 
livelihood approach. First, economic growth on the livelihood approach is 
intrinsically pro-poor emphasising the importance of capital in human 
development and the prevention of poverty. Lack or loss in one or more of the 
six types of capital may lead to poverty. The livelihood approach emphasises 
the empowerment of poor people through providing capital in various forms. It 
therefore emphasises redistribution, but not limited to income redistribution. It 
tries to empower the poor and relieve them from the state of financial 
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dependence and help them to help themselves. It is concerned with the society 
as a whole with its interacting layers of individuals, families, employers, 
communities, and the state all being important elements. Therefore, rather than 
over-emphasising the individuals’ efforts in a free market where individuals are 
treated as discrete entities, the livelihood approach emphasises the 
empowerment of all parts of the society through capital redistribution and 
accumulation. 
 
In the context of China, the livelihood approach implies deliberate countering of 
tendencies towards urban bias.  
 
First, the livelihood approach emphasises the identification of livelihood-related 
opportunities and constraints regardless of where these occur (Farrington et al., 
1999). As we discussed before, urban China suffers from serious 
unemployment. The capacity of urban areas to recruit more rural labourers is 
limited. At the same time, the rural-urban migrants who do not enjoy the status 
of urban residents suffer from many disadvantages when they work as contract 
employees (Li, 2004a). This problem demands changes in the urban resident 
registration system and granting rural migrants complete citizens’ rights.  
 
Second, the livelihood approach provides a holistic perspective on social policy 
which helps to bring up a broad range of issues that would not be addressed 
otherwise. For example, the state in China has been operating a ‘third way’ to 
poverty relief—resettlement of farmers from remote rural areas to urban areas 
or newly constructed small towns (Merkle, 2003). However, the result of 
resettlement is very much debateable, especially when the resettlement is 
involuntary (Croll, 1999). The challenges to resettlement are not limited to 
providing homes for the resettled. The greatest challenge lies in the 
establishment of a social and economic system that can help the resettled to fit 
into urban life. The components of such a system include various types of 
capital that are crucial for an individual, a community or a newly established 
city to survive: education and training, healthcare, employment opportunities, 
infrastructures, compatible social services and social protection. 
 
The livelihood approach sees social policy in much broader terms than being 
about provision of social services. However, social provision continues to play 
an important role. Crucially, it leaves room for the market, communities and 
various non-government organisations to play their parts. It is a development 
model which recognises the importance of local resources and experiences and 
encourages bottom-up initiatives (Hall and Midgley, 2003, p.104).  
 
State dominance in social reforms has been particularly strong in urban China. 
The state, as has been discussed, initiated reforms in all areas of traditional state 
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welfare: housing, pension, healthcare, education as well as social safety nets. It 
urged and compelled individuals and employers to contribute to individual 
accounts which aim at long term saving and social pooling to guard against 
bulky needs and emergency. These top-down changes reflected the state’s 
intention to withdraw from welfare provision and to negotiate and redraw the 
boundary between the state and the other potential undertakers of welfare 
payment and delivery. The state established social safety nets for the people 
experiencing various risks, such as job loss, ill health and loss in earning ability 
either in the short term or in the long term. Although the state began to serve as 
an enabler, assisting individuals or groups of peoples to get out of poverty by 
offering capital support, nevertheless the shrinkage in state responsibilities did 
not mean corresponding shrinkage in state control. In the whole pack of social 
policy, reforms were mainly top-down. Although in some areas such as 
healthcare and migrant housing, bottom-up changes are literally unpreventable 
(Shang, 2001), there have rarely been involvements of other actors during the 
process of policy planning. As a result, it is quite often the situation that the 
state became the ‘enemy’ of local initiatives and often engaged in destroying 
new initiatives at an early stage. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the relationship between economic development and 
social policy, and the outcomes in terms of poverty and inequality in China. 
This paper has distinguished between three main stages of reform. The first was 
based on the central planned model which tried to maintain equality through 
deep income redistribution and state social provision. Although China had set 
up a basis for heavy industry in the 1950s in this way, it suffered severely from 
the ills of central planning in the years to come. Social policy in this period was 
designed to serve urban industrialisation and keep social control. The second 
stage was the pro-urban growth era which focused on industrialisation and 
urbanisation. The role of social policy was mainly to facilitate privatisation and 
build up social protection for urban residents to guard them against the greater 
risks in the market economy. However in the 1990s, the shortcomings of the 
pro-urban growth model became clear. Rural areas failed to grow in step with 
the urban areas. Long term economic growth could not guarantee sufficient job 
opportunities for the growing urban population and the ever-increasing number 
of rural-urban migrants. The third stage started at the beginning of this century. 
It showed the state’s intention to cool down the overheating economy and target 
the poorest regions to narrow the gap between rural and urban areas.  
 
The centrally planned model and pro-urban growth model highlighted some 
major constraints facing China: 
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1.  It is a vast country size with a large population. 
2.  The majority of the population remained in agriculture. 
3.  Rural-urban divisions were great. 
4.  Regional development has been unbalanced. 
5.  Shrinking labour demand in the state enterprises has led to growing 
unemployment in urban areas. 
Some of these constraints are natural and some were caused or made worse 
during the central planning and pro-growth periods by state economic and social 
policies.  
 
Relevant data suggest that the early 1980s saw remarkable progress in reducing 
absolute poverty. However, in the 1990s, when the prolonged and fast economic 
growth dominated China’s image, some people, particularly those in rural areas 
and the loss-making state enterprises, had escaped poverty but fell into poverty 
again later. However, this was not a universal phenomenon. As some people fell 
more deeply into poverty, there rose up a new middle class who accumulated 
wealth faster than ever. The result was increased inequality and growing social 
tension. 
 
Such challenges have several consequences for social policy. First, the changing 
pattern of development in China reveals that in an economy limited in resources 
and constrained by various social and economic conditions, the state cannot 
single-handedly take up all the social responsibilities and effectively end 
poverty. Even if it claimed to do so, as in most centrally planned regimes, the 
coverage of social provisions would not be sufficient to keep people out of 
poverty. Secondly, economic growth needs to be accompanied by compatible 
social development. Biased social policy to guard the interests of urban 
population ultimately sets a limit on further growth and threatens social 
stability. Thirdly, social policy in the traditional sense plays an important role in 
developing countries but with the constraints of population, resources and level 
of development, it is almost impossible for the whole population to wait for the 
state to develop complete social services and provide them in the similar way as 
in many developed countries.  
 
We can generate an analogy of the problems faced by China. Imagine a tall 
building with modern flats built on top of ancient foundations and a basement 
accommodating a large population. The flats have the most up to date design 
and are equipped with new furniture; whereas the basement is dilapidated and 
poorly equipped. People living on the top update their flats so that the 
conditions can be as good as any newly built houses. They are also interested in 
further improving their living conditions by expanding the building upwards. 
They add more floors of modern flats on the top and hope they can improve 
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their living conditions endlessly in this way. However, they have little interest 
in taking care of the basement. Over the years, the bottom is further damaged by 
the heavier and heavier weight on top. People living in the basement are eager 
get out of the crushed basement and obtain better conditions at higher level. 
However, the capacity of the top flats is limited. It is constrained by two factors: 
the space limit and the limited potential for expansion. What is more, the 
potential for expansion is actually constrained by the condition of the poor 
quality of the base. In the past, people from the upper floors tried to limit the 
number of people trying to move upward so that the capacity of the upper floors 
would not be too stretched. However, this approach neglected the fact that the 
bottom is very crucial for the stable expansion of the top. It was the poor 
condition of the basement that actually bounded the capability for further 
expansion on the top. To improve the capacity of the building, it is crucial to 
strengthen the base and improve the living conditions of the people in the 
basement as well. The improvement can be done with the help of the people 
from the upper floors. It can also be achieved in part by the people living in the 
lower part. However, it is important to provide them with the skills, resources 
and equipment to improve the basement. Fundamentally, it is crucial to 
understand the fact that improving the basement is not only necessary to 
improve the living conditions of the people living at the bottom, but also a 
necessary condition to be satisfied for the expansion of the whole building—
including the expansion at the top. 
 
The message in this analogy is clear, China’s experience in development and the 
accumulated problems of poverty and inequality provide a very good case for 
broad-based development, in which social policy deliberately targets the 
‘weakest links’, and generates opportunities, and reallocates capital of all types 
to facilitate long term development.  
 
The livelihood approach provides a useful framework for analysing the 
relationship between economic development and social policy. It does not treat 
social policy as serving a specific development strategy, but rather playing a 
holistic role addressing various sources of opportunities for and constraints on 
human development. Also, social policy is not limited to state intervention and 
top-down policy initiatives. It aims to integrate actors at various stages and 
seeks development at all levels. China’s history of economic development 
suggests that there is a growing need for re-examining wider social policy as 
distinct from the specific economic development strategies. The overall 
constraints in economic resources also suggest that mobilisation of all resources 
(including various assets held by individuals, households, communities and 
localities) is very important to achieve social development. 
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The People’s Republic of China has had a most remarkable and, in parts, 
turbulent history. While there have been heavy and tragic human costs in terms 
of famines, persecution and waste of human potential, there has also been rapid 
economic development. This development has not been equally distributed and 
poverty and inequality are major, probably growing, problems. State policy has 
in general, emphasised economic progress, while social policy has been treated 
as secondary. Yet social policies have, as described here, been crucial to how 
China developed and in particular to the extent of poverty and inequality. 
Indeed, there are many other aspects of broader social policy not considered 
here—population policy, policy towards minorities, the system of political 
control, for example—which have had profound influences. 
 
The analysis presented here does point to the importance of approaching social 
policy not just in relation to ‘social services’—a concept essentially imported 
from richer industrialised countries. For the future, in which Chinese social 
policy will undoubtedly face many challenges, the livelihood approach within a 
broad social development model offers an approach to social policy that may 
best address the problems of poverty and inequality and promote harmonious 
development in the interests of all. 
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